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GOODWILL HARBORING:
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT
OF 2006 LEGITIMATES THE GOODWILL
INVESTMENT IN A TRADEMARK WHILE

SAFEGUARDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."'
Perhaps, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA),
signed into law on October 6, 2006 by President George W. Bush,
is best understood from Justice
Holmes's above quoted
perspective. Subject to endless criticism from all angles of
academia and the professional realm2 , the TDRA has lumbered
through a painstaking series of revisions, redactions, and additions
to resurrect a cause of action for trademark dilution in the form of
blurring and tarnishment.3 Some critics view the TDRA as a
duplicative cause of action stepping on the feet of infringement.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. See, e.g., J.Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and
United States Law Compared, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163 (2004).

Professor

McCarthy notes:
No part of trademark law that I have encountered in my forty
years of teaching and practicing IP law has created so much
doctrinal puzzlement and judicial miscomprehension as the
concept of "dilution" as a form of intrusion on a trademark. It
is a daunting pedagogical challenge to explain even the basic
theoretical concept of dilution to students, attorneys, and
judges. Few can successfully explain it without encountering
stares of incomprehension or worse, nods of understanding
which mask and conceal bewilderment and misinterpretation.
Id. at 1163.
3. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (Reported in Senate),
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
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Other critics view the TDRA as an overly cumbersome legal tool
for a species of harm more elusive than the leprechaun.
Nonetheless, trademark-holders' goodwill investment in the
creation of famous marks has compelled Congress to resurrect a
federal cause of action for trademark dilution under § 43(c) of the
Lanham Act 4 that was virtually eliminated by the Supreme Court
in Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc.'
This Article examines the recent enactment of the TDRA,
paying particular attention to its eleventh-hour additions to
safeguard it from First Amendment conflicts. It addresses the
TDRA's reaffirmation that the preservation of a famous mark
holder's goodwill investment in the mark is as meritorious as the
prevention of consumer confusion. Part I provides a brief history
of dilution, chronicling its American debut in Professor
Schetcher's landmark law review article to its post-Mosley
makeover. Part II outlines the differences between the TDRA and
its predecessor, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA), and it highlights how concerns raised in scholarly
literature have been addressed by the language of the TDRA. Part
III analyzes the TDRA's First Amendment safeguards. In this
section, I will argue that the TDRA represents a measured and
well-developed revision of the FTDA. Part IV concludes with
several recent cases that illustrate how the TDRA is neither
redundant nor insensitive to the preservation of free speech.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Dilution's "Radical"'Origins

The concept of dilution as a separate basis for trademark
protection appears to have originated in the German courts, where
a maker of mouthwash and a manufacturer of steel products
wanted to use the same brand name, "Odol." 7 The writings and
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
5. Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
6. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).

7. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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congressional testimony of Professor Frank Schechter then
introduced the concept to the American legal system in the 1920s
and 1930s.8
Schechter advanced the thesis that the consumer-protection
model, which bases a cause of action upon substantial similarity
between marks likely to cause consumer confusion, could not
adequately accommodate the realities of twentieth century
marketing.9
He proposed instead to recognize that "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark... constitute[s] the
only rational basis for its protection."1 That is, Schechter believed
that it was the mark's uniqueness that gave it its advertising appeal
and selling power. According to Schechter, a trademark's benefits
were "diluted" (a term borrowed the term from the Odol case)
when its unique qualities were appropriated by a junior user but
the public had always associated these qualities with a senior
user's product." Schechter justified this thesis with the insight that
the "real injury" caused by the concurrent use of famous marks
was not consumer confusion but "the gradual whittling away or
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the
mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods." 2
No jurisdiction has ever adopted Schechter's original dilution
proposal, however, as its practical effect would create trademark
property rights in gross in suitably "unique" marks. 3 Indeed, in
the early drafts of the TDRA, a proposal to base antidilution on
"uniqueness" was rejected. 4

§ 24:67 n. 1 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
8. See Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927), reprintedin 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 831, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 345.
11. Id.; see also Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 453.
12. Schechter, supra note 8, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 342.
13. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA
L. REv. 621 (2004).
14. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualPropertyof the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31-32 (2005) [herinafter 2005 Hearing]
COMPETITION,

(prepared statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark
Association ("INTA")).
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Dilution under the FTDA

Under the FTDA, "dilution" meant "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties or
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 The FTDA's
legislative history also indicates that Congress intented it to cover
dilution by "tarnishment, '"' 6 and any other form of dilution that
may have been recognized under common law. 7
The FTDA proclaimed to protect against the "dilution of the
distinctive quality of the famous mark."' 8 As an aid to the courts,
the FTDA set forth eight non-exclusive factors to consider in
determining whether a mark was famous:
the degree of inherent
(a)
distinctiveness of the mark;

or

acquired

(b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
(c) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark;
(d) the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used;
(e) the channels of trade for the goods or services

15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2000).
16. "Tarnishment" refers to unauthorized uses of a famous mark that
associate it with a degrading or inferior product. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
7, § 24:89.
17. Senator Hatch has stated:
[T]his bill is designed to protect famous trademarks from
subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of
confusion. Thus, for example, the use of Dupont shoes, Buick
aspirin, and Kodak pianos would be actionable under this Bill.
141 CONG. REC. S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch), 1995 WL 770583.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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with which the mark is used;
(f) the degree of recognition of the mark in the
trading areas and channels of trade used by the
mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(g) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and
(h) the existence of a registration under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act19 of February 20, 1905, or
on the Principal Register.
Once the plaintiff successfully showed ownership of a famous
mark, it then had the burden of proving: (1) the defendant used the
mark in commerce after the plaintiffs mark became famous; and
(2) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark caused the dilution
of the distinctive quality of the mark.2°
1. Blurring
The classic form of trademark dilution occurs through
"blurring." Blurring has been described as the "whittling down" of
the identity or reputation of a trademark or a trade name.2" The
idea is that if a junior user were allowed to use another's famous
mark for noncompeting goods or services, then the mark would
soon lose its ability to invoke the senior user's goods or services in
a consumer's mind. That is, the famous mark's "commercial
magnetism" is less capable of functioning as a strong brand
signifier when other companies are allowed to sell a variety of
unrelated goods under the same name.22 In other words, there is a
loss of distinctiveness through the blurring of the mental image the
mark makes in the minds of the consumer.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 38 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts§ 10 (2007).
22. David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 117, 119 n.3 (2004).

23. Professor Beebe has observed:
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The harm imagined by dilution is progressive in nature.
Professor McCarthy explains this progressive erosion with an
analogy to a glass of water into which a single drop of red dye is
placed. 24 At first, the change is slight, and the depth of the red
does not approximate the drop; however, as more and more drops
25
are added, the saturation of the water closely resembles the drop.
Likewise, the economic harm caused by blurring is imagined as
the mark loses its selling power with each successive unauthorized
use of the mark, or drop in the water.26
An example of a mark that was found sufficiently similar and
famous to support a dilution action by blurring was "Polaroid"
optical devices and "Polaraid" heating and refrigeration services.27
Another example is the phrase "The Greatest Show on Earth" for a
carnival and "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" for a car
dealership.28 However, neither "Cue" for a magazine that was
subsequently used for a toothpaste29 nor "Freedom" for a savings
and loan company that was then used by a real-estate company

What is at issue [in a cause of action for blurring] . .. is not
relations of reference, but relations of difference. What is
being protected is not the trademark's distinctiveness of
source or product, but its distinctiveness from all other
trademarks, including, most importantly, identical marks ....
Ultimately, in protecting the identity of the trademark signifier
itself, antiblurring protection preserves the uniqueness of the
relation not between the trademark signifier and its signified

or referent, but between the trademark signifier's one type and
the many tokens of that type in the marketplace. A defendant
"blurs" this relation when it establishes a new similar or
identical type to which plaintiffs or defendant's tokens might

also refer.
Beebe, supra note 13, at 700.
24. See Franklyn, supra note 22, at 127 (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 24:92.2 (rev. ed.

2003)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
28. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. CelozziEttelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988).
29. See Cue Pub. Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1965).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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were sufficiently famous to warrant a finding of blurring.3"
2. Tarnishment
Dilution by "tarnishment" is the other classic prong of dilution
theory.3
Unlike blurring, tarnishment refers to cases where
unauthorized uses of a famous mark tarnish the mark's image by
associating it with a degrading or inferior quality product.32 As the
Second Circuit has observed, "[t]he sine qua non of tarnishment is
a finding that plaintiffs mark will suffer negative associations
through defendant's use."33 As Professor McCarthy explains, once
a famous mark is tarnished, it is still capable of uniquely
identifying a certain source, but it no longer identifies a particular
degree of quality or favorable reputation. 4
The positive
associations with the mark are undermined and diluted by the
tarnishing use.35
The concern is that the use of the mark in this undesirable way,
compounded with the mixed mental association by the consumer,
will reduce the public's esteem for the senior mark in some
significant capacity.36 Thus, a poster-distributor selling posters
with the message "Enjoy Cocaine" in the font and color used by
Coca-Cola was found to be diluting due to the offensive
association of the soft drink with an illegal drug.3 7 Likewise, while
on a lunch break as he was writing this section, this author
observed a man wearing a T-shirt bearing the slogan "Toke" in the
same soft-drink manufacturer's font and colors. It too would
likely be found tarnishing, as it also suggests an unwholesome
30. See Freedom Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir.
1985).
31. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:89.
32. See id. § 24:70.
33. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Hensen Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (finding no
tamishment of the trademark SPAM, where a Muppet pig character named
"Spa'am" was used, as defendant was engaged in parody, which is protected
expression under the First Amendment).
34. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:89.
35. Id.
36. 38 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts § 11 (2007).
37. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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association between consuming the cola and illegal barbiturates.38
Conversely, in a case involving the sale of "CatDog" cheese
crackers, crackers in the shape of a goldfish, the court held the
crackers were not likely to tarnish the famous mark for Goldfish
crackers under either state or federal law. According to the court,
the televised cartoon program upon which the CatDog crackers
were based were not tarnishing either, as the program did not
depict obscene, sexual, or illegal activities, and the crackers were
not of an inferior quality.39
3. Tarnishmentfollowing Mosley
In 2003, the Supreme Court speculated in dictum that
tarnishment might not have been encompassed within the FTDA.4°
Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, suggested that because
the statute did not include the "likelihood of injury to business
reputation" phrasing that the 1964 Model State Law Bill
contained, which was also included in many state anti-dilution
statutes, tarnishment was not a part of the dilution doctrine in the
FTDA.4 Justice Stevens stated:
The District Court's decision in this case rested on
the conclusion that the name of petitioners' store
"tarnished" the reputation of respondents' mark,
and the Court of Appeal relied on both
"tarnishment" and "blurring" to support its
affirmance.
Petitioners have not disputed the
relevance of tarnishment, . . . presumably because
that concept was prominent in litigation brought
under state anti-dilution statutes and because it was
mentioned in the legislative history. Whether it is

38. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 203 (holding adult film actress wearing attire similar to the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders diluted the reputation of plaintiff, as it drew
unwholesome analogy between plaintiff and the adult film industry).
39. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 205 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
40. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
41. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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actually embraced in the statutory text, however, is
another matter. Indeed, the contrast between the
state statutes, which expressly refer to both "injury
to business reputation" and to "dilution of the
distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark,"
and the federal statute which refers only to the
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the
FTDA.42
Until the passage of the TDRA, this dictum left academics and
practitioners scratching their heads wondering which way the
Court would hold if squarely presented with the issue.43
4. Remedies under the FTDA
Under the FTDA, § 1125(c)(2) provided that the owner of a
famous mark was entitled only to injunctive relief, unless the party
causing the dilution willfully intended to trade on the reputation of
the mark or cause the dilution of the mark. 4 If such willful intent
was proven, the owner of the famous mark would be entitled to the
remedies set forth in § 35(a) and § 36 of the FTDA, in the
discretion of the court and under the principles of equity.45 As
such, the prevailing owner of a famous mark was entitled to
recover damages (including the possibility of treble damages), the
defendant's profits stemming from the diluting activity, attorney's
fees, and would be able to request the destruction of all of the
diluting materials.46
5. Defenses and FirstAmendment safeguards under the FTDA.
In deference to the First Amendment and comparative
advertising, the FTDA expressly exempted several uses of famous
trademarks from the scope of its enforcement. First, any "fair use
of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
42. Id.
43. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:95.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
45. Seeld.§§ 1117(a), 1118.

46. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark" was exempted from the
Act.4 7 Additionally, any "noncommercial" use of a famous mark,
including parody and satire,48 and "all forms of news reporting and
news commentary" were exempted.49 Finally, there was no
language in the FTDA or its legislative history indicating that
Congress intended to preempt state anti-dilution statutes, with the
exception of Section 43(c)(3). Section 43(c)(3) provided that
ownership of a valid federal registration was a complete bar to any
dilution action brought by another person under state statute or
common law against the mark owner with respect to that mark. °
Under the aegis of the noncommercial use defense of §
1125(c)(4)(B), Congress intended to accomplish two goals. First,
it intended to incorporate speech fully protected by the First
Amendment, as opposed to the Court's concept of limited
protection for "commercial speech."51 Second, it intended to
forbid the use of the FTDA from enjoining famous marks in
noncommercial settings, such as editorial product reviews. As the
First Circuit noted before the enactment of the FTDA, "if the antidilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark owner to
enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context found to be
negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from
criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical
52
of its conduct.
47. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A); see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41
F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding defendant's advertisement of the Deere logo
animated as a small, frightened deer fleeing from a small dog and the
competitor's lawn mower was not fair use and diluted Deere's mark).
48. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding parody of Dr. Seuss children's book that lampooned the
O.J. Simpson trial was not protected parody under section 11 25(c)(4)(B)).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B), (C) (2000).
50. See id. § 1125(c).

51. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir.
2002); see also Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D.
Ohio 2002).
52. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987);
see also N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff could succeed on a claim of dilution by
tarnishment under state law after a casino with a New York City theme used the
slogan "NEW YORK NEW YORK SLOT EXCHANGE" on a facade
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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One such case arose in the Ninth Circuit and involved Mattel's
iconic BARBIE mark. 3 In that case, the court held the use of the
BARBIE mark in a song and that parodied the carefree,
materialistic image sometimes associated with the doll was speech
fully protected from liability for dilution under the
"noncommercial use" exception. 4 The court stated that the
legislative history from both the House and Senate demonstrated
that Congress intended the FTDA not to inhibit speech that did not
propose a commercial transaction.5 Writing for the majority,
Judge Kozinski reasoned that unless the song was viewed as
artistic expression, the court would have been creating a new
species of speech doctrine with the potential to open a "Pandora's
box," thereby giving exclusive use of speech throughout all of
commerce and, potentially, beyond to big merchant lobbyists. 6
The court acknowledged this risk, noting that such a dilution
injunction would be overbroad, subsuming artistic expression fully
protected as free speech. 7
Similarly, an artist's still life
photographs that placed BARBIE in perilous situations, such as in
resembling the New York Stock Exchange Building, as "a reasonable trier of
fact might find that the Casino's humorous analogy to its activities--deemed by
many to involve odds stacked heavily in favor of the house--would injure
[plaintiff's] reputation.").
53. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 898-99.
54. Id. at 906-07.
55. Id. at 905-06 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995)).
56. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 187, 207-08 (2004). Judge Leval further noted that the instant case
could also have been dismissed under the news commentary exclusion of
section 1125(c)(4)(C):
The song's depiction of Barbie as emblematic of an
insouciant, mindlessly playful and materialistic world,
embodying values as durable as a plastic toy, is without
question a comment on the state of society. It would make
little sense to construe "news commentary" as restricted to
comment on today's news stories, but excluding broader
commentary on the moral condition of society.
Id. at 207.
57. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (2), cmt. i (1995) (supporting the FTDA's position

that "Extension of the antidilution statutes to protect against damaging
nontrademark uses raises substantial free speech issues and duplicates other
potential remedies better suited to balance the relevant interests").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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a blender, did not tarnish the BARBIE image either. The use was
considered artistic and noncommercial. 8
Under the "news" item defense of § 1125(c)(4)(C), the media
was free to use trademarks in the context of conveying news and
information. Furthermore, the media was free to modify or use
famous marks in its political cartoons, stories, and elsewhere,
because critical commentary of the mark holder by using its
trademark was outside the scope of a cause of action for dilution. 9
Lastly, at least one court held that the "fair use" defense that is
applicable to a cause of action for trademark infringement was also
applicable to a cause of action for dilution under the FTDA. In
Playboy Enterprises v. Welles, the Ninth Circuit held that under
the fair use defense, a former Playboy Playmate of the Year could
use several Playboy trademarks on her website, including the
PMOY acronym for Playmate of the Year, to indicate she was the
recipient of that award without diluting Playboy's mark.6" The
Ninth Circuit stated that because Welles's use was a nominative
use, by definition it did not dilute Playboy's marks.6 According to
the court, the defendant's use of PMOY "[did] not create an
improper association in consumers' minds between a new product
and the trademark holder's mark," because the defendant was
simply referring to the trademark holder's product.62
C. Dilution after Mosley
Following the passage of the FTDA, the circuit courts were split
on whether the FTDA required the owner of a famous mark to
prove actual harm as a prerequisite to injunctive relief. This
58. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir.

2003); see also Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682
(holding politician's use of a cartoon duck that was similar to the AFLAC duck
in order to call his opponent a "quack" who was "ducking the issues" was
noncommercial speech fully protected by the First Amendment); MasterCard
Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (holding campaign ad that borrowed the "for everything else there's
MasterCard" theme was noncommercial and, thus, not diluting).
59. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:127.
60. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. Id. at 806.
62. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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question was addressed in the Supreme Court's decision in
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, a dilution action between the
lingerie company Victoria's Secret and a small retail company,
Victor's Little Secret, that sold, among other items, adult
"novelties."63
In a carefully worded opinion, the Court quoted from the
statutory definition of "dilution" rather than defining it itself.64
Further, as noted above, the Court questioned whether § 1125(c)
included a cause of action for tarnishment by quoting a Second
Circuit opinion that used a restrictive interpretation of § 1125(c),
which did not recognize a cause of action for tarnishment.65
Most significantly, the Court read § 1125(c) to require the
plaintiff show actual evidence of dilution, instead of a mere
likelihood of dilution, in order to attain judicial relief.6 The Court
admitted that requiring evidence of actual dilution might result in
"difficulties of proof," but it justified itself by reasoning that the
Perhaps as a
language of the statute required as much.6"
dilution
such as
evidence
of
consolation, the Court stated, "direct
consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can
reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence - the obvious
case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical."68
This language created consternation with subsequent courts.
Some courts read the Court's language to mean that when the
parties' marks are identical, direct evidence of dilution is
unnecessary.69 Other courts read the passage to mean that when
the parties' marks are identical the only additional evidence
necessary to show dilution is circumstantial evidence, rather than
direct evidence.7°
63. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
64. Id. at 433. The TDRA does not define dilution either, and the Court
simply quoted § 1125(c)(1)'s phrase "dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark" to highlight its pithiness. Id.
65. Id. at 427 (citing Nabisco v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999)); see
also Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1153 (2006).

66. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
67. Id. at 434.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004).
70. See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d
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In addition to this new fissure among the circuits, further
restrictions were placed on the FTDA by the lower courts. One
such limitation included the Second Circuit's denial of protection
to marks that were not inherently distinctive (i.e., marks which
have not yet acquired secondary meaning)." Further, the Ninth
Circuit expanded its interpretation of the noncommercial use
exception of § 1125(c)(4)(B) to include all speech that contained at
least a modicum of non-commerciality (i.e., speech that did more
than merely propose a commercial transaction).72 With the FTDA
riddled by the relentless jab of critical judges, the dilution doctrine
was primed for a federal rebirth.
III. FEDERAL DILUTION

2.0 AND THE TDRA

A. The Revisionists
The International Trademark Association, represented by
President Anne Gundelfinger,73 the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, represented by William G. Barber,74 and the
Section of Intellectual Property Law of the American Bar
Association, represented by chairman Robert W. Sacoff, combined
forces to provide significant guidance to Congress as it drafted the
1081, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2004). According to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair

Competition, a mark may acquire secondary meaning if although it is not
"inherently distinctive," (i.e., the nature of its designation and the context as
used makes it likely that prospective purchasers will perceive it as a designation

of goods or services) it has become distinctive as a result of its use.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995).
That is,
prospective purchasers have come to perceive the mark as a designation of
goods or services. Id.
71. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comm., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir.
2001).
72. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir.
2003).
73. See 2005 Hearing,supra note 14, at 20-40 (prepared statement of Anne

Gundelfinger, President, INTA) ("[T]he designation of source requirement will
ensure that dilution protection is clear and focused on dilution harm, and is
appropriately balanced against First Amendment considerations.").
74. Id. at 51-66 (prepared statement of William G. Barber, Partner, Fulbright
& Jaworski, LLP).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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TDRA.75 Their efforts concluded with two hearings before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property (CIIP), where the witnesses focused on the
standard of harm threshold articulated in Mosely. In pertinent part,
Barber testified:
We believe that the First Amendment concerns that
were expressed in the hearing before this
Subcommittee last year arising in the context of use
of a famous mark in connection with legitimate
commentary, criticism, parody, etc., can be fully
addressed either by amending the defense set forth
in Section 43(c)(3)(A) in H.R. 683 as follows:
Fair use of a famous mark by another
person,
including
for purposes
of
comparative commercial advertising or
promotion to identify the competing goods
or services of the owner of the famous mark.
Or by adding a new defense to Section 43(c)(3) as
follows:
Use of a famous mark to comment on,
criticize, or parody the owner of the famous
mark or the goods or services in connection
with which the famous mark is used.7 6
Additionally, Gundelfinger observed that "By the time
measurable, provable damage to the mark has occurred much time
has passed, the damage has been done, and the remedy, which is
injunctive relief, is far less effective. 77 The Committee on the
Judiciary, to whom the TDRA was referred, endorsed this position:
Mosely created an undue burden for trademark holders who contest
diluting uses.
75. See SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 108TH CONG., COMMITTEE
PRINT TO AMEND THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT (Comm. Print

2004).

76. 2005 Hearing,supra note 14, at 65-66 (statement of William G. Barber,
Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP).
77. Id. at 22 (prepared statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, INTA).
78. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005).
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Additionally, Representatives Lamar Smith, CIP Chair, and
Howard L. Berman, ClIP ranking member, directed questions
focused on a close reading of the TDRA's language to the
witnesses testifying at the hearings. Professor Mark Lemley of
Stanford Law School represented the academic community and
testified:
The legislative history of the FTDA made it clear
that the meaning of "commercial use" was
established by long-standing case law interpreting
the "commercial speech" doctrine in the First
Amendment. Under these principles, only speech
that proposes a commercial transaction, not any
speech that may ultimately generate revenue, is
commercial speech to which the dilution statute
applies. Congress should reaffirm that history in
reenacting identical language in [the TDRA]. "
An attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union spoke at
both hearings about the First Amendment issues implicated by
antidilution protection."0
Civil organizations such as Public
Citizen and Public Knowledge also became closely involved in the
drafting process when the Senate was considering the bill,
successfully arguing critical free speech amendments into the
language of the Act.8" With such diverse and critical commentary
79. 2005 Hearing, supra note 14, at 47 (statement of Mark A. Lemley,

Professor of Law, Stanford University).
80. Id. at 69-83 (prepared statement of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (stating that a cause of action for
tarnishment would stifle free speech and that the commercial/non-commercial
speech dichotomy strips protection from commercial speech and speech with
only incidental commercial components).

81. See Public Knowledge, H.R. 683: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2005, http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/tmdilution (last visited
October 30, 2007). Public Knowledge notes:
Limiting the rights of individuals to utilize trademarks in their
speech not only chills the ability of individuals to
communicate to the public, it prevents the public from hearing
the often valuable messages being expressed by the
individuals.
By making injunctions against speech that
comments on products and the corporations who distribute
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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a drastically
upon the TDRA, academicians have embraced
82
respect.
of
deserving
as
different legislation
B. Notable Characteristicsof the TDRA.
Section 1125(c)(1) now reads:
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall
be entitled to an injunction against another person
who, at any time after the owner's mark has
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of
actual economic injury.83
Of initial note, the TDRA provides that the plaintiff need only
show a likelihood of dilution in order to prevail under § 1125(c),
effectively overriding the central holding of Moseley.84 Next, §
1125(c) now states that marks that have not yet acquired secondary
meaning may qualify for antidilution protection as famous marks.85
Further, "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source
of the goods or services of the mark's owner."86
This new definition of "fame" discards the doctrine of "niche
fame," which had spawned in the absence of a definition. Fame on

them more likely, H.R.683 diminishes the right of the public

to access information about the largest and most influential
corporations in American society today.

Id.
82. See Beebe, supra note 65, at 1155.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
84. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B); see also Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 433-34 (2003) (holding that a finding of dilution under the FTDA
requires a showing of actual harm and that a likelihood of harm is insufficient.).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5).
86. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

17

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAUL JART& ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:267

a national level is now required instead.8 7 Thus, on its face, the
TDRA appears to undo the Second Circuit's per se requirement for
inherent distinctiveness; however, the prefatory language used in
its list of factors for determining the famousness of a mark
indicates that the factors are non-exclusive. "[The] court may
consider all relevant factors ....88 This means the Second Circuit
may still include its previous analysis under the FTDA in new
TDRA claims, but it will have to tailor its analysis such that a lack
of inherent distinctiveness does not necessarily make the mark
incapable of being diluted.
Additionally, a mark's famousness will be determined by the
court after an application of four factors, which were slimmed
down from the FTDA's eight factor list. The reordered factors of
the TDRA now provide:
In determining whether a mark possesses the
requisite degree of recognition, the court may
consider all relevant factors, including the
following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic
reach of advertising and publicity of the
mark, whether advertised or publicized by
the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered
under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the
mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under
the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.
87. Id. According to Professor McCarthy, "niche fame" refers to marks that

are not "famous" in a national or world scope, but are well known in a defined
trade or geographical area. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:105. McCarthy
refers to this as the "big fish in a small pond" theory of relative strength. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
89. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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The first factor looks to the reach of the mark's advertising,
while the second factor incorporates sales and the third factor
measures the responsiveness of consumers to their exposure to the
mark. Lastly, while the fourth factor incorporates registration into
the court's analysis, it should be a relatively insignificant factor, as
it merely reveals whether the mark is distinctive enough to gamer
infringement protection.9"
C. Dilution by Blurring
The TDRA states that both dilution by blurring and dilution by
tamishment are actionable under § 1125(c). 9 Dilution by blurring
is now defined as "an association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark. 9 2 Professor Beebe has
observed that this is a four-part definition.93 First, "mark or trade
name" reveals that the defendant's use of a mark must be as a
source indicator of the defendant's goods or services.94 Second,
consumers must make a mental association -"a mental connection
of relational significance," between the plaintiffs and defendant's
mark.95 Third, the mental connection must arise from a similarity
between the marks.96 And fourth, the association must impair the
former mark's distinctiveness.97 Thus, the combination of the
second and third requirement increases the burden on the plaintiff,
requiring him or her to show more than that two marks are merely
90. See Beebe, supra note 65, at 1159 (noting this factor is arguably
irrelevant to the fame analysis, and, at best, shows whether the plaintiff
considered their mark to be of sufficient value to justify registration).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
92. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
93. See Beebe, supra note 65, at 1165-70.
94. Id. at 1166. As such, the traditional body of trademark law still requires:

(1) the physical use, in commerce, of a symbol to create a separate and distinct
commercial impression, identifying the source to consumers (not competitors);
and (2) the cognitive use of a mark so that it is intrinsically capable of being
understood as a signal of the sources of goods or services, enabling the mark
holder to distinguish the user's goods from others. [cite suggested]
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

19

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

286

DEPA UL J ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:267

identical. In the wake of Moseley, some courts had assumed that
blurring could be presumed if two marks were identical, but the
new language of the TDRA will require the plaintiff to show both
that the marks are identical and that consumers conflate the
sources.

98

The TDRA also enumerates a non-exclusive list of factors that
courts should consider to determine the likelihood of dilution by
blurring. 99 In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely
to cause dilution by blurring, courts may now consider all relevant
factors, including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent
distinctiveness of the famous mark.

or

acquired

(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of
the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous
mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.' 00
Here, the second and third factors work to regulate the degree of
protection a mark may receive. Professor Beebe has pointed out
that these factors highlight the difference between the subjectmatter and the scope of anti-blurring protection, because they limit
the amount of protection to the degree of distinctiveness. 1 That
is, while APPLE as a mark is "arbitrary," and thus inherently
98. See id. at 1167-68 (enumerating examples such as United for an airline
and for a moving company and Ace for bandages and for a hardware store
chain).

99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) (2006).
100. Id.
101. See Beebe supra note 65, at 1147-50.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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distinctive, it is still used to indicate sources such as a bank and a
record company. 102 As such, the rationale for protecting it from
further use with dissimilar products or services is much more
attenuated than it is for preventing new use of arbitrary marks,
such as GOOGLE or KLEENEX, where there is no need to tie
these marks to new products. 1°3 That is, the arbitrariness of the
marks is so unrelated to both the product and the English language
that there is no genuine need for these words to describe other
products in dissimilar markets. These subsequent producers
should be required to create the same goodwill association that
GOOGLE and KLEENEX have created on their own.
The remaining blurring factors revisit and refine the FTDA. 1°4
The first factor limits the courts analysis to the marks. The fourth
factor is effectively tautological, and it acknowledges that once a
mark meets the threshold determination that it is famous, it may
then be more or less famous. That is, the mark has met the
threshold requirement of famousness, and this factor simply
acknowledges the distance between the floor and the ceiling of
fame, so to speak. The fifth factor calls for the court to inquire
into whether the association created between the marks was the
Whereas the
result of deliberate action by the defendant.
association of the mark APPLE with both computers and the
record company does not result in a loss of distinctiveness, if a
defendant intends to create confusion between two products, the
court will assume the defendant was successful in creating such
confusion and weigh this against the defendant. The point is that a
mere association between marks is, in and of itself, insufficient to
find a loss of distinctiveness. When such an association is coupled
with a bad faith intent, however, any justification for overlooking
this action ignores the goodwill investments the prior user had put
into their mark. Likewise, the sixth factor acknowledges that the
best indication of a loss of distinctiveness is from actual evidence
of such a loss. Surveys and anecdotal evidence, as used to show
trademark infringement, will likely suffice here as well.

102. Id.at 1171.
103. See id.
104. Id.
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D. Dilution by Tarnishment
The TDRA defines dilution by tarnishment as "an association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."' 5
Like dilution by blurring, the plaintiff must make a threshold
showing that the defendant is using the mark as an indicator of the
source of defendant's goods or services. Anything less than using
the plaintiffs mark as an indicator, such as using product design,
product packaging, or trade dress similar to that of plaintiff, will
not suffice. Next, consumers must make an "association" between
the famous mark and the allegedly diluting mark. Whether the
association is tarnishing, however, will depend upon whether the
association "harms," or is likely to harm, the famous mark's
reputation.0 6 Finally, the plaintiff must show that the association
generated in consumers' minds is a result of the "similarity" of the
parties' marks.0 7
The distinction that needs to be made here is between traditional
trademark infringement and non-diluting, non-tarnishing use of a
plaintiffs mark. For example, returning to the "Toke" t-shirt the
author observed on his way to lunch, if the t-shirt had instead
stated "Toke Coke," this would not be actionable because the
defendant's shirt is not acting as a source indicator of the t-shirt.
Instead, the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark, COKE, to refer
to the plaintiff. As such, in situations like this, the TDRA requires
the plaintiff to show that the defendant's use would function as a
designation of source for the defendant's goods but for the alleged
tarnishment.'08

105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Beebe, supra note 65, at 1172 n.128 (noting past cases in antitarnishment law such as "Michelob Oily," "Enjoy Cocaine," and the adult film
Debbie Does Dallas, which briefly clothed several actresses in outfits closely
resembling the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniform, would similarly not
satisfy the TDRA's requirements, because in each case the defendant was using
the plaintiff's mark to refer to the plaintiff).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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E. Trade Dress Dilution
The TDRA now explicitly addresses a civil action for trade
dress °9 dilution when the trade dress is not registered on the

Principal Register) ° The plain language of the Act requires the
person who asserts trade dress protection for such marks to prove
the following:
(A) the claimed trade dress, taken as a whole, is not
functional and is famous; and
(B) if the claimed trade dress includes any mark or
marks registered on the principal register, the
unregistered matter, taken as a whole, is famous
separate and apart from any fame of such registered
marks. 11 '
Subsection (A) thus incorporates by reference the requirements
for famousness that were enumerated in subsection (c)(2), and it
prohibits plaintiffs who claim they are suffering trade dress
dilution from escaping the limitations for trademark
infringement. 12 That is, § 1125(a)(3), which provides a cause of
action for trade dress infringement, states that the person asserting
trade dress protection for trade dress that is not registered on the
principal register has the burden of proving that the trade dress is
109. "Trade dress" involves the total image of a product and may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture and graphics; it
is simply a form of trademark, to which standard principles of trademark law are
applicable. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 38 (2007).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
111. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A), (B).
112. Id. § 1125(c)(4)(A). In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001), the Supreme Court held that trade dress may not
receive protection for product features that are functional. In determining
whether trade dress is functional, the courts consider several factors:
(1) whether the design yields a utilitarian advantage;
(2) whether alternative designs are available;
(3) whether advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of the
design; and
(4) whether the particular design results from a comparatively
simple or inexpensive method of manufacture.
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001).
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not functional." 3 The FTDA had not closed this loophole, but now

any uncertainty surrounding the burden of proof for functionality
is clearly resolved against the plaintiff.
Additionally, subsection (B) limits the scope of dilution
protection for unregistered trade dress subject matter that appears
in conjunction with trade dress that already receives protection
from the principal register. For example, while the renowned
Starbucks logo on the side of disposable coffee cup receives
protection as a matter of its registration, whether a green banded
circle with a black center that includes white text is protected on
all white disposable coffee cups will depend upon whether that
unprotected subject matter can meet the same showing of fame
under subsection (2)(A) of the TDRA. Clearly, Congress' concern
was to subject unregistered trade dress to the same strict
requirements whether a plaintiff was filing an action for
infringement or dilution.
F. Other Provisions of the TDRA
The principal remedy under the TDRA is injunctive relief.
Subject to the principles of equity, a court may enjoin another
person from using a mark or tradename so long as the mark or
tradename was used in commerce and its continued use is likely to
cause dilution by blurring or tamishment." 4 The TDRA specifies
that the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion,
competition, or actual economic injury shall not prevent the court
from issuing an injunction." 5
Additional remedies include those set forth in sections 1117(a)
and 1118 of the Lanham Act." 6 However, a plaintiff will still be
subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
Further, these remedies only apply to commercial uses that began
after October 6, 2006. Lastly, to receive the additional remedies in
an action for dilution by blurring, the person against whom the
injunction is sought must have willfully intended to trade on the
recognition of the famous mark. If the action is for dilution by
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).
114. Id. § 1125(c)(1).

115. See id.
116. See id. § 1125(c)(5).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/3
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tarnishment, the person against whom the injunction is sought
willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous
must have
117
mark.
IV. SAFEGUARDING FREE SPEECH

The defenses to a claim of dilution have been substantially
buttressed through the cumulative efforts of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the efforts of Paul Alan Levy, while
he was drafting his article The Trademark Dilution Revision ActA Consumer Perspective."8 The statute as enacted now reads:
(3) Exclusions
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this
subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or
descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such
fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the
person's own goods or services, including
use in connection with(i) advertising or promotion that
permits consumers to compare goods
or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or
services of the famous mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news
commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark." 19

117. Id. § 1125(c)(5)(B).
118. See Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act--A
Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189
(2006).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

25

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

292

DEPAULJ.ART&ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:267

However, the road to the inclusion of so many exclusions was
nearly as long as the entire TRDA revision process.
A. The Evolution of the FirstAmendment Protections
In a recent symposium on the TDRA hosted by Fordham Law
School (Fordham Symposium), Michael Heltzer, then manager for
external relations for the International Trademark Association
(INTA), the largest organization in the world dedicated to
trademark protection in commerce, gave a brief overview of the
steps taken by Congress to safeguard the First Amendment from
the TRDA. 2 ° Heltzer explained that when the TDRA was first
introduced as H.R. 683, Marvin Johnson, Legislative Counsel to
the ACLU, testified that changing the requirement of a showing
from actual dilution to a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment
might enable trademark owners to impinge upon free speech
rights.12 ' Johnson stated that without a showing of actual harm,
trademark law could be used "as a pretext to stifle criticism,
parody or legitimate competition when there is no reasonable
likelihood of confusion and no actual dilution caused by use of the
trademark."' 22 Johnson continued, "[d]ilution causes of action are
problematic under the First Amendment because they allow
commercial entities to secure injunctions prohibiting speech that is
truthful and neither misleading or confusing."' 23 In support of the
ACLU's position, Johnson cited CPC International,Inc. v. Skippy
Incorporated,where the Fourth Circuit stated, "It is important that
trademarks not be transformed from rights against unfair
competition to rights to control language . . . [because] such a
transformation would diminish our ability to discuss the products
or criticize the conduct of companies that may be of widespread
public concern and importance . . .. ""'4 That is, the ACLU
120. Symposium, Panel II: Trademark Dilution Revision Act Implications,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1093, 1097-98 (2006).

121.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TESTIMONY AT A HEARING ON

H.R.

638, "THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT OF 2005," February 17, 2005,
at 4-7, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/johnson021705.pdf
[hereinafter ACLU TESTIMONY].
122. Id. at2.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy, Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir.
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believes that trademarks are essential to our shared culture and
communication about particular goods and services because they
often represent the most effective means by which to state one's
1

opinion.

25

William G. Barber, a member of the Fordham Symposium,
noted that the ACLU was initially "not a fan" of the
noncommercial-use exception that was included as a First
Amendment safeguard in the FTDA, and that they went along with
taking that provision out of the TRDA in favor of a more specific
parody fair-use exception. 126 The parody fair-use provision they
advocated instead would avoid what the ACLU believes is the
difficult distinction between commercial and non-commercial
speech.127 As Johnson stated, "under the FTDA, critical websites
and parodies that generate incidental revenue could still be found
to be 'commercial' and therefore subject to an injunction. The
result is a chilling of the expressive use of trademarks in speech
that mixes traditionally understood free speech with commercial
elements."

28

As an example, the ACLU pointed to an anti-

smoking campaign that appeared in Adbusters magazine featuring

2000)); see also Marla J. Kaplan, Antidilution Statutes and the First
Amendment, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992) (arguing anti-dilution statutes are
designed to protect private interests but not the public, which was trademark
law's historical purpose, and that antidilution statutes encroach on the First
Amendment because no substantial government interest supports them and they
prohibit commercial speech that is not misleading or deceptive).
125. ACLU TESTIMONY, supra note 121, at 3; see also Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 424 (1988) (stating that the First Amendment not only protects the
right to advocate a cause, but also the right to select the most effective means to
do so).
126. Symposium, supra note 120, at 1102-03.
127. ACLU TESTIMONY, supra note 121, at 6. While both commercial and

non-commercial speech are protected under the First Amendment, commercial
speech does not receive as much protection as non-commercial speech. See Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).

Furthermore, drawing the distinction between commercial speech

and non-commercial speech can be difficult. Whereas commercial speech is
"speech proposing a commercial transaction," Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980), non-commercial is not defined
by a bright-line. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983).
128. ACLU TESTIMONY, supra note 121, at 8.
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"Joe Chemo," a parody of Camel Cigarette's Joe Camel
character.1 29 The parodies depict the Joe Camel character in a
hospital gown walking down a corridor attached to an intravenous
drip machine and then again in an open coffin wearing a suit. In
both of the parodies, the Camel trademark and font was used to
state "Joe Chemo" instead of Joe Camel. 3 The ACLU noted the
parodies represent "a type of important civic speech that ...makes

critical commentary on the trademark holder, [which furthers] the
traditional goals of trademark law by informing the consumer
about the goods and services they purchase" - albeit in a way the
mark holder would likely object to.' 31 Further, while one could
argue that the Joe Chemo parodies do not function as a trademark
because they are not acting as a designation of a source, as soon as
the parodies were printed on a T-shirt or used as the logo of an
anti-smoking campaign website, the logo might be "commercial"
and without First Amendment protection. As such, the ACLU
believed only a parody exception could avoid the pitfalls of the
early versions of the TDRA. It believed the other versions of the
TRDA "inappropriately" relied on a distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech, because it only afforded
non-commercial speech protection and striped protection from
commercial speech and speech with only incidental commercial
components. 32
'
Barber has noted that in response to these concerns, the AIPLA,
INTA, and ACLU negotiated an exclusion into H.R. 683 by the
House IP Subcommittee.'33 The non-commercial use defense was
replaced by a fair use exclusion that allowed "fair use of a famous
mark by another person, other than as a designation of source for
the person's goods or services, including for purposes of
identifying and parodying, criticizing or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark

129. Id.

130. Id.
131. Id.

132. Id. at 7.
133. William G. Barber, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005:
Breathing Life Back Into the Federal Dilution Statute, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2006).
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owner."' 34 Barber stated that although he believes there is some
merit to the principle of the noncommercial use exception, it still
presents a "slippery slope."' 35
Barber notes that "a purely
noncommercial gripe [web] site by a consumer that has had a
problem with some product they (sic) have bought from a
trademark owner," is "fine" by him.'36 The problem he has is that
"a lot of these gripe websites really have commercial aspects to
them. Some of them are even done by competitors.' 37
Paul Alan Levy, another member of the Fordham Symposium
and an attorney specializing in free-speech on the internet with
Public Citizen Litigation Group,'38 has meanwhile noted that the
ACLU's actions, while helpful, resulted in more complications
than they could have anticipated.'39 Levy stated: "Although this
exception was plainly written with free speech considerations in
mind, and standing alone was plainly a desirable addition to the
bill, as a substitute for the non-commercial use exception it was
actually worse from the perspective of any ordinary citizen who
must face the realities of litigation."' 40
Levy believes that without the non-commercial use exception
speakers and artists are not able to use trademarks as "important
cultural reference points" to make their conversational and artistic
points more clearly. 4 ' As an example, Levy points to Judge Alex
Kozinski's article Trademarks Unplugged,'42 which discusses
Walter Mondale's criticism of Gary Hart in the 1984 primaries."'
Mondale used Wendy's slogan "Where's the Beef?" to comment

134. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683 (Referred to S.
Comm.), 109th Cong., § 2(c)(3)(B) (2005).
135. Symposium, supra note 120, at 1102.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Public Citizen is a public-interest law firm founded by Ralph Nader in
1972 that litigates federal health and safety regulations, consumer litigation,
open government, union democracy, separation of powers, and the First
Amendment. Id. at 1100; see also Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org.
139. See Levy, supra note 118, at 1208.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1209.

142. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960,
972-76 (1993).
143. Levy, supra note 118, at 1209.
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on Hart - not the fastfood company. Although the comment was
non-commercial, it did not parody or criticize Wendy's; as such,
Mondale would not be able to invoke a free speech exemption to
the TDRA. 144
Levy further noted that photographers, writers, and artists would
be adversely affected by the removal of the non-commercial use
exception from the TDRA if they could not invoke the expansive
interpretation to the non-commercial use exception the Ninth
Circuit had recently read into it. 145

Under the Ninth Circuit's

reading of the non-commercial use exception, when an artist used
a famous mark to comment on society at-large instead of the
holder such use was still non-commercial expression even though
it was sold for a profit. 146 It was not intended to confuse
consumers or misappropriate the mark's cache. Artists find it
difficult to depict an everyday scene without referring to famous
marks, be it a Coke can or the Sears Tower, Levy noted, because
the work is not commenting on the mark as much as it is using it to
establish societal context.1 47 For example, Levy points to Donald
Stewart, a graphic artist who employs visual puns, such as a
Volkswagen "bug" drawn as though it were constructed of insect
parts, who was threatened with a dilution suit by Lawyers for
Volkswagen

of

America.1 41

Stewart

could

easily

and

inexpensively defend under the non-commercial use exception, as
understood by the Ninth Circuit, even though he sold his artwork.
However, without the non-commercial use exception, Stewart
would have to invoke the complex multi-factor fair-use parody
test, but the cost of litigation would likely put him out of
business.149

Levy raised his concerns with the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the eve of the Committee's markup, and the version of the bill
144. See MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding Nader's use of the "priceless"

punch-line from the MasterCard commercials was not diluting under the noncommercial use exception even though Nader used "priceless" to comment on
other politicians but not MasterCard).
145. Levy, supra note 118, at 1209.
146. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. Levy, supra note 118, at 1210.

148. Id.
149. See id.
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that passed added the exclusion for noncommercial use back into
the bill.'50 As such, when viewed in light of the exclusions for
"[a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary," in addition
to the parody exemptions, the TDRA alleviates the great majority
of legitimate First Amendment concerns."'
V. EXAMPLES OF PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED SPEECH UNDER
THE

TRDA

At this point several examples are in order to illustrate how the
TDRA will preserve the goodwill investments of famous mark
holders while enjoining free-riders who seek to appropriate a
famous mark's ability to easily and clearly distinguish itself from
its competitors.
A. Classic Blurring and Tarnishment
A recent example of dilution arose in the case of Starbucks
Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir.
2007). While the Second Circuit remanded the case because the
district court erroneously evaluated the dilution claim under the
FTDA instead of the TRDA, this case presents an excellent
example of dilution by tarnishment. 5 2 In Wolfe 's Borough Coffee,
Starbucks alleged that Wolfe's current sale of coffee under the
name "Mister Charbucks" or "Mr. Charbucks" infringes and
dilutes the "Starbucks" trademark for coffee.5 3 Following a bench
trial, the District Court of the Southern District of New York
concluded that Starbucks had failed to carry its burden of proving
trademark dilution under either the FTDA or New York Gen. Bus.
Law § 360-1.'4 From the ensuing judgment, Starbucks appealed.
The Second Circuit held that TDRA applied to the instant case to
the extent that Starbucks has sought injunctive relief on the issue

150. Id. at 1211-12.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B) (2006).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
153. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. (Starbucks 11), 477
F.3d 765, 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
154. Id. at 765-66.
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of dilution.'55 The court noted that relief by injunction operates
prospectively and, as such, the right to injunctive relief must be
determined as of the time of the hearing. 5 6 As such, the district
court's judgment was vacated and the case was remanded.'57
Interestingly, even though the district court was evaluating the
claim under the FTDA, it found that Starbucks could not prove
either dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment. Under the
blurring claim, the court stated, "although Starbuck's survey
results indicated that 39.5% of people associate the term
"Charbucks" with "Starbucks" or coffee, there was no indication
that that was attributable to any usage of that term by Wolfe, or
that such usage affected the ability of the Starbucks marks to serve
as a unique identifier of their products."' 58 However, the court
acknowledged that the evidence showed Wolfe's principal intent
in adopting the "Charbucks" moniker was to "evoke associations
with the sort of dark-roasted coffee purportedly favored by
Starbucks' clientele." The only shortcoming of Starbucks cause of
action, under the district court's analysis for dilution by blurring,
was that the evidence of record did not demonstrate any likely
diminution of the capacity of the Starbucks mark to serve as
unique identifiers of Starbucks' products by reason of Wolfe's
commercial activities.'59
Applying the blurring factors of section 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) of
the TDRA 6 ° on remand, Starbucks should be able to prevail. First,
the degree of similarity between "Charbucks" and "Starbucks" is
strong. It takes little imagination or effort to draw the intended
analogy.
Second, the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the Starbucks mark is as strong McDonalds or
Pepsi. The reference to Herman Melville's Moby Dick has as
much to do with coffee as apples have to do with computers.
Additionally, the Starbucks mark has acquired so much

155. Id. at 766.
156. Id. (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184, 201 (1921)).
157. Id.
158. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. (Starbucks 1), 79
U.S.P.Q.2d 1138, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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distinctiveness that one can hardly help but conjure up a mental
image of the green and white logo upon hearing the name. Third,
the extent to which Starbucks is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark appears to be as strong as Coca-Cola.
Fourth, the degree of recognition of the Starbucks mark as high as
it can be, and fifth, Wolfe's use of the "Charbucks" mark was
admittedly intended to create an association with the famous mark.
Wolfe's intent was to "evoke associations with the sort of darkroasted coffee purportedly favored by Starbucks' clientele."''
Finally, the court itself noted the actual association between the
mark and the famous mark with the survey that showed 39.5% of
the people surveyed associated the term "Charbucks" with
"Starbucks" or coffee.162 In light of the new TDRA analysis, the
district court would be remiss if it did not find dilution by blurring.
As such, the purpose of the TDRA to protect the substantial
advertising and goodwill associated with the Starbucks mark is
honored.
Further, upon remand the district court should clearly find
dilution by tarnishment. Wolfe is using the mark "Mr. Charbucks"
to portray Starbucks coffee in an unwholesome or unsavory
context with the result that the public will associate a lack of
prestige in the plaintiffs unrelated goods. The district court itself
noted that Starbucks' survey results indicated that 43.3% of the
respondents, when queried as to whether they "[w]ould ... have a

positive impression or negative impression of a coffee called
'Charbucks," indicated that they would have a "negative"
impression of such a coffee. 6 3 It is worth noting that reported
responses to the open-ended question "If the name 'Charbucks'
were used for a type of coffee, how would you describe the
coffee?" were much less indicative of any potential for
tarnishment; only 6.3% of the respondents provided what was
characterized as "generally negative" response." 6 However, when
the survey respondents were asked how they would link the term
"Charbucks" to Starbucks," it was generally described as a "joke"

161. Starbucks 1, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1145.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1145-46.
164. Id. at 1146.
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or a "rip-off.' ' 65
Against these survey results, a likelihood of dilution by
tarnishment, "an association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation
'
is a much closer question. Starbucks can
of the famous mark,"166
clearly make a threshold showing that Wolfe is using the mark as a
source indicator, and the survey results overwhelmingly show
consumers must make an "association" between the famous mark
and the allegedly diluting mark. Whether the association is
tarnishing, however, which depends upon whether the association
"harms" Starbucks reputation, could go either way. However,
Starbucks can show that the association generated in consumers'
minds is a result of the "similarity" of the parties' marks. As such,
any resistance by the district court to finding that Wolfe's use of
the "Mr. Charbucks" mark dilutes the Starbucks mark would make
this a prime case for reversal by the Second Circuit.
On a final note regarding the Wolfe case, a cursory glance back
at the exemptions should make it clear that Wolfe can not avail
itself of any of the enumerated defenses. "Mr. Charbucks" is a
commercial use of a mark in commerce. It is not news reporting,
nominative fair use, or parody, because the defendant intentionally
used the mark to evoke the sort of associations it believed
Starbucks drinkers preferred, in an attempt to appropriate the
goodwill that had been generated by Starbucks' advertising.
B. Classic Free Speech
In Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, one
of the first cases to be decided under the TDRA, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the
application of the dilution statute to an alleged parodist. 67
Plaintiff, Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., (LVM) manufactures
luxury consumer goods, including luggage and handbags, in
addition to a limited number of high-end pet products, such as

165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006).
167. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp.
2d 495, 498 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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leashes and collars that range in price from $250 to $1600.68
LVM's products have used an intertwined monogram L and V as a
trademark since 1896.169 Defendants Haute Diggity Dog, LLC
(HDD), Victoria Dauernheim, and Woofies, LLC d/b/a Woofie's
Pet Boutique, market stuffed toys for dogs for around $10 under
the name Chewy Vuiton 70 LVM alleged trademark dilution by
blurring and by tarnishment, and both parties filed for summary
judgment. 7 '
Under the dilution by blurring claim, the court cited Second
Circuit precedent under New York General Business Law § 360-1,
which it believed incorporates the likelihood of dilution standard
adopted by Congress in the TDRA.'72 The Court then noted that in
the case of parody, the use of famous marks causes no loss of
distinctiveness, because the parody's success depends upon the
continued association with the plaintiff's mark.'73 Further it noted
that the presence of a famous mark on certain products may have
little diluting effect, particularly where it is obvious that the
defendant intends the public to associate the use with the true
owner. 1
While the Court conceded that LVM's mark was strong and
famous, it nonetheless found no likelihood that the parody would
result in dilution of LVM's mark by blurring. The LVM mark
continued to be associated with the true owner, LVM, and the
success of the parodic use depended upon the continued
association with LVM.
As such, the court concluded no
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiffs mark is
diluted by blurring in this case."'
Next, under the dilution by tarnishment claim, the Court noted
74

168.
169.
170.
such as

Id.
Id.
Id. Defendant also produces products that parody other companies,
Chewnel # 5, Dog Perignon, and Sniffany & Co. Id.

171. Id.
172. See id. at 505.
173. Louis Vuitton, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 505 (quoting Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v.

News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying New
York statute)).
174. Id. (quoting Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221
F. Supp. 2d 410, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

175. Id.
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that tarnishment depends on either the likening of a high quality
product to one of low quality or a negative portrayal of the high
quality product; tarnishment is unlikely when the association is
made through harmless or clean puns and parodies.176 The Court
found that LVM's dilution claims were baseless, and without
merit, because its only "flimsly" theory was that a pet might some
day choke on a Chewy Vuiton squeak toy and incite the wrath of a
77
confused consumer against LVM.
Plaintiff's assertions that Chewy Vuiton products tarnish LVM's
marks by associating "inferior products" with the Vuitton name
that plaintiff provides are neither examples of actual tarnishment,
nor any evidence that shows likely tarnishment. 78 At oral
argument, therefore, the Court concluded that no reasonable trier
of fact could find for LVM on the issue of dilution by tarnishment
and granted HDD's motion for summary judgment on the
179

tarnishment issue.

In stark contrast to the Wolfe case discussed above, LVM failed
to provide the court with any evidence that consumers thought any
less of Louis Vinton's products or mistook the squeaky dog toys
for a cheap knock-off of an expensive counterpart. Therefore,
LVM was not entitled to fetter the parodic use of its mark in the
name of preserving the goodwill investment in their mark. And
while defendant HDD could not contest that its use of the
plaintiff's mark was a commercial use, without the parody
exemption of the TDRA, LVM would have been able to obstruct
HDD's ability to freely engage in a comedic dialogue. That is a
harm no one, mark holder or not, should have to suffer.
Fortunately, the TDRA represents a measured balance between
protecting the goodwill investment in a mark and the First
Amendment's protection of free speech.
VI. CONCLUSION

The intent of the TDRA is to protect the goodwill investment of
mark holders, while carefully restricting the breadth of the Act's
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Louis Vuitton, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
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causes of action. The TDRA's exemptions have been thoroughly
revised to provide complete First Amendment protection. As
enacted, it safeguards the rights and interests of artists and
competitors alike. Each is free to comment on, criticize, or parody
a famous mark, so long as it does not disparage or obfuscate the
famous mark by piggy-backing off of the famous mark's
substantial investment in its own fame. The TDRA is a laudable
revision, and it deserves a respectful application by both courts and
commentators alike in the years to come.
William Joern*
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